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INTRODUCTION
The question presented in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC is whether or not a schoolteacher should be
considered a minister.1 Although the school teacher in this case, Cheryl
Perich, began her employment as a lay teacher, she soon became a called
teacher with the title ―commissioned minister.‖2 She taught a religion class
four times a week and led her class in daily prayers.3 During the bulk of her
workday, however, Perich taught math, reading, English, social studies,
science, gym, art, and music to third and fourth graders.4
Perich claims the school retaliated against her in violation of the
Americans with Disability Act (ADA). During the summer of 2004, Perich
became seriously ill.5 She took disability leave when school started in the
fall and was eventually diagnosed with narcolepsy.6 In January 2005,
Perich informed the school principal that her doctor had cleared her to
return to work.7 In response, the principal voiced concerns about the safety
of students under Perich‘s care.8 The school board then expressed its
opinion that Perich would not be physically capable of returning to work
and requested that she resign in exchange for assistance with her health
insurance.9 Perich declined the offer.10 Her doctor released her to return to
work on February 22, 2005, effectively ending her disability coverage.
When Perich reported for work on February 22, the school did not have a
job for her.11 Because the school handbook states that failure to return to
*
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work the day after an approved medical leave expires may be considered a
voluntary termination, Perich refused to leave school grounds without a
letter acknowledging she had appeared for work.12 After Perich told the
principal that she would sue for disability discrimination, she was fired.13
Correspondence from the school indicated that she lost her job because of
her insubordination and her threats to take legal action.14 Under the ADA, it
is illegal for an employer to retaliate against an employee for bringing or
threatening to bring a disability discrimination suit.15
The success of Perich‘s ADA claim turns on whether the Supreme
Court finds that she is a minister. If she is not a minister, she will probably
win. After all, the school stated in writing that a main reason for Perich‘s
termination was her threatened lawsuit. If, on the other hand, she is a
minister, she will lose. She will lose because, under the ministerial
exception doctrine, ministers may not sue their employers for
discrimination.16
The ministerial exception grants religious organizations immunity from
employment discrimination suits by ministers even if the discrimination is
not religiously required.17 Thus, even if the tenets of the Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church forbid discrimination on the basis of
disability—and in fact their Governing Manual for Lutheran Schools states
that the school will not discriminate on these grounds18—ministers cannot
sue the school for disability discrimination. The lower courts, who created
and uniformly apply the ministerial exception, claim that the First
Amendment‘s religion clauses require it.19 According to the lower courts,
interfering with clergy employment decisions would undermine the church
autonomy guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, they fear
that these suits would lead to entanglement with religious doctrine and
therefore violate the Establishment Clause.20
12

Id.
Id. at 774–75.
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request that her call be rescinded because of her ―insubordinate and disruptive behavior‖ on the day she
reported back to school, and because she had ―damaged, beyond repair‖ her working relationship with
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42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (link).
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See Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 776.
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They are mistaken. Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the
Establishment Clause necessitates the ministerial exception. As a neutral
law of general applicability, the ADA does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. Furthermore, trying to discern whether or not Perich is a minister
creates more Establishment Clause problems than simply resolving her
retaliation claim.
I.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JUSTIFICATION

A. Employment Division v. Smith
The ministerial exception was created before Employment Division v.
Smith announced a major shift in free exercise jurisprudence. Employment
Division v. Smith held that as long as a law is neutral and generally
applicable, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it imposes a
substantial burden on religion.21 Smith itself upheld a law that made a
religious sacrament illegal.22 Because the ADA is both neutral and
generally applicable, Smith should defeat any free exercise justification.
Nonetheless, courts and commentators have insisted that Smith applies
only to individual free exercise claims and not to institutional ones.23 They
claim Smith makes this distinction when it notes that ―[t]he government
may not . . . lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over
religious authority or dogma.‖24 They argue for ―church autonomy‖ in
matters of internal governance and, as support, point to a line of church
property cases (several mentioned by Smith) where the Supreme Court has
deferred to the church hierarchy.25 Consequently, they argue, courts should
development, and justifications for ministerial exception) (link). Hosanna-Tabor represents the first
time that the Supreme Court will address the ministerial exception.
21
494 U.S. 872, 879, 882–83 (1990) (link).
22
Id. at 874 (recognizing that plaintiffs‘ use of peyote was a sacrament in their Native American
Church); id. at 890 (denying plaintiffs an exemption from the Federal Controlled Substance Act that
made such sacramental use illegal). It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss whether Smith was
correctly decided. Perhaps exemptions that do not impose burdens on others ought to be required under
the Free Exercise Clause, although such a claim would have to explain why religious but not equally
strong secular moral commitments are protected. In any case, exemptions for religious employers from
antidiscrimination law clearly impose a significant burden on those seeking the protection of those laws.
23
See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (link); Douglas
Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 36 (2000).
24
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (internal citations omitted). They read ―religious authority‖
as a reference to church hierarchy and those who lead the church rather than as a reference to religious
texts. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
4, 19–20 (2000) (stating that Smith reaffirmed a church‘s autonomy regarding its internal governance).
Nevertheless, the latter interpretation reads better in the context of the sentence, whose language about
taking sides in religious disputes draws from Establishment Clause constraints. Furthermore, had the
Supreme Court meant to exclude churches from its new rule, one would have expected it to do so more
explicitly rather than rely on one possible interpretation of ―authority‖ in the phrase ―religious authority
and dogma.‖
25
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (link); Presbyterian Church v.
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likewise defer to church employers when it comes to employment
discrimination suits involving their ministers.26 A minister, after all, ―serves
as the church‘s public representative, its ambassador, and its voice to the
faithful.‖27 Furthermore, the deference should be absolute, so that in all
discrimination cases, the minister loses.
To be sure, in deferring to the highest church authority, the Supreme
Court did recognize a degree of church autonomy. However, animating the
Court‘s recognition of church autonomy was the Establishment Clause
concern that the state would entangle itself in theological or doctrinal
disputes.28 The Establishment Clause bars the courts from resolving
theological or doctrinal disputes, or endorsing one version of religious truth
over another.29 The state is considered incompetent in these religious
matters. For example, in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church (the first church property case cited in
Smith), the Supreme Court invalidated a Georgia law that required the
courts to resolve a property dispute between a general church and
breakaway local churches by deciding whether the general church had
departed from the religious tenets it held at the time the local churches first
affiliated with it.30 Entanglement concerns also explain the holdings of the
two other cases cited by Smith.31
In addition, reliance on this line of cases is misplaced because it
ignores Jones v. Wolf,32 the last church property dispute decided by the
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem‘l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (link); Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (link); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 679 (1871) (link).
26
See generally Thomas C. Berg, Kimberlee Wood Colby, Carl H. Esbeck, & Richard W. Garnett,
Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, & the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY (forthcoming 2011).
27
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (link); see also McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972) (―The minister is the chief instrument by which the church
seeks to fulfill its purpose.‖).
28
See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (―[T]he First Amendment severely
circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. Most
importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the
basis of religious doctrine and practice.‖ (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)) (link).
29
Thus, as examples, the state cannot declare that Catholics practice the correct version of
Christianity or that the Catholic Mass is properly performed in Latin rather than English.
30
393 U.S. at 441, 449–50. In fact, the Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church did not actually
defer to the church hierarchy. See id. at 449–51.
31
In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Supreme Court
rejected the New York legislature‘s finding that one faction would better carry out the church‘s mission
and opted for deference to the highest church body. 344 U.S. 94, 106 n.10, 107–09, 117–18 (1952). In
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, the Supreme Court declined to rule on whether the
church properly applied its own policies. 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976). Notably, the case does not address
the issue of the Court‘s competency to rule on whether the church failed to abide by state laws.
32
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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Supreme Court. As the most recent case involving churches rather than
individuals, its precedential value cannot be ignored.33 And in Jones v.
Wolf, the Court explicitly rejects blanket deference to religious institutions.
B. Jones v. Wolf
Like previous church property disputes, Jones v. Wolf involved a
schism within a church. A majority of the Vineville church in Macon,
Georgia, voted to separate from the Presbyterian Church in the United
States.34 Both the majority congregation and the minority that wished to
remain affiliated with the Presbyterian Church in the United States claimed
the church property as its own.35
The Supreme Court rejected a rule requiring it to defer to the church
hierarchy of the Presbyterian Church in the United States:36 ―We cannot
agree, however, that the First Amendment requires . . . a rule of compulsory
deference to religious authority in resolving church property disputes, even
where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved.‖37
Instead, the Supreme Court endorsed a neutral principles of law
approach: ―We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to
adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property
dispute.‖38 In other words, the Court endorsed resolving the church‘s
property dispute in the same way that it would resolve the property dispute
of a secular organization. Thus, the Court approved of ―examin[ing] the
deeds to the properties, the state statutes dealing with implied trusts, and the
Book of Church Order to determine whether there was any basis for a trust
in favor of the general church.‖39
The Supreme Court realized that Establishment Clause issues may
arise under a neutral principles of law approach.40 Nevertheless, the neutral
33

In addition to misreading the church property cases, the claim that Employment Division v. Smith
applies only to individual and not institutional free exercise claims also overlooks the general shift in
religion clause jurisprudence—a shift that Smith embodies—towards more equal treatment of religion
and nonreligion. See Corbin, supra note 20, at 1990–96. Also, providing religious individuals with no
protection from neutral laws of general applicability while protecting absolutely religious institutions
privileges the derivative right over the original, individual right to free exercise. See id. at 1987–89.
34
Jones, 443 U.S. at 598.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 604–05 (―The dissent . . . would insist as a matter of constitutional law that whenever a
dispute arises over the ownership of church property, civil courts must defer to the authoritative
resolution of the dispute within the church itself.‖ (internal quotations omitted)).
37
Id. at 605; accord id. at 602 (―[T]he First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a
particular method of resolving church property disputes.‖).
38
Id. at 604.
39
Id. at 600 (internal citations omitted). In other words, the Court expressly contemplated that the
courts would look at religious documents like a church constitution for language of trust. Id. at 604.
40
Id. at 604 (―This is not to say that the application of the neutral-principles approach is wholly free
of difficulty. . . . If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the
civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal
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principles approach is constitutional ―so long as it involves no consideration
of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets
of faith.‖41 Thus, the possibility that Establishment Clause issues may
surface under a neutral principles of law approach does not preclude such
an approach. Perhaps that bears repeating: Just because an Establishment
Clause issue may arise in the adjudication of a particular type of claim does
not mean that the Court must forever abandon trying to resolve such a claim
using neutral principles of law.42
Furthermore, the Jones Court recognized that a deference approach
does not eliminate all Establishment Clause problems. When church
structure is ambiguous, determining which unit of the church governance
has ultimate control might well result in entanglement with church
doctrine.43 In that case, it is actually the neutral principles of law approach
that can best avoid entanglement because it ―obviates entirely the need for
an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine . . . .‖44
In short, controlling precedent does not require that the courts simply
defer to the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in this
internal governance dispute. Instead, courts may resolve this retaliation
claim in much the same way they resolve any other retaliation claim. Only
if adjudication of this claim entangles a court in theological or doctrinal
questions should the court opt for deference to church authorities. This
conclusion is especially true because, as Jones v. Wolf acknowledges, a
deference approach might actually cause more Establishment Clause ills
than a neutral principles of law approach.
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JUSTIFICATION
A. Neutral Principles of Law Approach: Resolving the Retaliation Claim
Supporters of the ministerial exception retort that resolving
discrimination claims violates the Establishment Clause because their
adjudication requires courts to evaluate a minister‘s spiritual qualifications
or determine whether a minister sufficiently embodies the church and its
teachings.45 Even assuming some employment discrimination cases might
issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.‖).
41
Id. at 602 (quoting Maryland & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (link)).
42
See id. at 604 (―On balance, however, the promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in
the neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems in
application.‖).
43
See id. at 605.
44
Id.
45
Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 2004 BYU L.
REV. 1593, 1613 (link); see also Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that the
court could not ―imagine an area of inquiry less suited to a temporal court for decision [than] evaluation
of the ‗gifts and graces‘ of a minister‖ (quoting Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
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present these Establishment Clause problems, not all do.46 Perich‘s claim in
Hosanna-Tabor does not. Consequently, the Establishment Clause cannot
justify the blanket immunity that the ministerial exception provides.
It is incorrect to assume that adjudicating ministers‘ anti-discrimination
claims will require courts to decide questions beyond their institutional
competence. A court may easily resolve Perich‘s retaliation claim without
becoming entangled with doctrinal or theological questions. In order to win
her retaliation suit, Perich must prove that (1) she engaged in activity
protected by the ADA; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and (3)
there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
action.47
As the Sixth Circuit concluded, ―contrary to Hosanna-Tabor‘s
assertions, Perich‘s claims would not require the court to analyze any
church doctrine.‖48 Perich‘s protected activity was the assertion of her legal
rights under the ADA, and the adverse action was her termination. As in
most retaliation cases, the pivotal question is whether the assertion of her
legal rights caused her termination.49 It is uncontested that the school sent
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990))) (link); Brief for the Petitioner at 14, HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (June 13, 2011) (―The Establishment
Clause also prevents courts from deciding the religious questions that are inevitably involved in
employment disputes over ministers.‖) (link).
46
For example, Title VII sex harassment cases and Fair Labor Standard Act wage and hours cases
do not involve reinstatement or evaluation of the plaintiff-minister‘s ―gifts and graces.‖ Indeed, these
cases are unrelated to the church‘s selection of its representatives and control of its voice, and therefore,
they should not fall within the purview of the ministerial exception. For just this reason, several courts
have held that the ministerial exemption should not apply to sexual harassment cases. See, e.g., Bollard
v. Cal. Province of the Soc‘y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999) (link). The same should hold
true for wage and hour cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See, for example, Shaliehsabou v.
Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc.:
[T]he requirement that the Hebrew Home pay employees, like Shaliehsabou,
overtime does not require the government—or the court—to question the Hebrew
Home‘s religious beliefs, inquire into the religious nature of the activities that
Shaliehsabou performs, or to become involved in any way in the governance or
functioning of the institution.
369 F.3d 797, 805 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(link).
47
See, e.g., Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 516 (6th Cir. 2009) (link); Bryson v. Regis
Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir. 2007) (link).
48
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 781 (6th Cir.
2010).
49
It is worth noting that case law is unclear about whether Perich needs to prove that retaliation was
the but-for cause, or merely one cause, of her termination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarified that
discrimination need only be ―a motivating factor‖ for liability under Title VII. Lower courts differ about
whether this standard also applies to suits under the ADA and other anti-discrimination statutes.
Compare Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying the ―butfor‖ standard to an ADA claim) (link), with Martin v. Cal. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 560 F.3d 1042,
1048 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the ―motivating factor‖ standard to an ADA claim) (link).
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her a letter stating that the school board intended to fire her because her
threatened legal action ruined her working relationship with the school.50
Thus, unlike most cases, Perich has direct evidence of retaliation.51
1. Main Religious Claim Is a Free Exercise Claim
Hosanna-Tabor nevertheless argues that there is a religious question
because Perich was fired for being insubordinate and spiritually unfit.52
First, she had been unruly and disruptive when asserting her legal rights,
thereby ruining her relationship with the school.53 Second, instead of
trusting the church‘s mandatory dispute resolution process, Perich sued in
court.54 Of course, in a secular context, firing someone for asserting her
legal rights is the very definition of retaliation and is illegal no matter how
disruptive, insubordinate, or infuriating the employer may find it.
Moreover, any contract where the employee has signed away all rights to
bring a discrimination claim against her employer is void as against public
policy.55 That is, a contractual provision stipulating that all discrimination
claims will be resolved internally rather than before a neutral third party is
unenforceable.56 Does the religious context, however, change the retaliation
question into a religious question, the resolution of which violates the
Establishment Clause? Hosanna-Tabor‘s argument boils down to this: a
religious organization should be able to proclaim ministers spiritually unfit

50

Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774.
The principal sent Perich a letter stating that due to her disruptive behavior on the day she
reported back to work, the board would request her termination. Id. The letter also stated that she had
―damaged, beyond repair‖ her working relationship with the school by ―threatening to take legal action.‖
Id.
52
According to the school, Perich was fired ―because her insubordination and threats of litigation
violated Church teaching.‖ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Hosanna-Tabor, No. 10-533 (Oct. 22,
2011) (link).
53
Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774.
54
See id. at 782.
55
Employees may not by contract prospectively waive their civil rights:
51

[W]e think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee‘s rights
under Title VII. . . . Title VII‘s strictures are absolute and represent a
congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory
practices. . . . [W]aiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional
purpose behind Title VII.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50–51 (1974) (link).
56
While employees may agree to bring civil rights claims before a neutral third party arbitrator
rather than in court, the agreement is valid only if ―the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.‖ Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 28, 30 (1991) (allowing arbitration clauses for civil rights claims on the assumption that the
arbitrator will be a ―conscientious and impartial‖ arbiter and noting that the applicable arbitration rules
―provide protection against biased panels‖) (link). It is doubtful that Hosanna-Tabor‘s ―internal dispute
resolution‖ process would even qualify as arbitration, much less meet this standard.
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anytime they assert their legal rights or insist that the church follow the law,
and for the secular courts to disagree with this assessment violates the
Establishment Clause.
Again, a court could avoid all Establishment Clause issues and still
resolve this retaliation claim. To be sure, the Court would violate the
Establishment Clause if it declared what the church‘s true beliefs were with
regard to insubordination among its ministers. But the Court could assume
that under Evangelical Lutheran Church tenets dissension can compromise
a minister‘s spirituality and even that it was spiritual unfitness and not
pique or financial considerations57 that motivated Perich‘s dismissal in this
case,58 and still hold that the church violated the law. How? HosannaTabor‘s claim that Perich was spiritually unfit because she threatened legal
action does not in fact deny that her legal conduct caused her termination.
Instead, the argument is that the retaliation is religiously required.
Nonetheless, it is still an admission of retaliation.
Thus, under one understanding of the case, to the extent there is a
religious question, it is really a free exercise question. In other words,
assuming that Perich is a minister and that Perich‘s assertion of her legal
rights compromises her spiritual fitness, is Hosanna-Tabor nonetheless
liable under the ADA? The question before the Court does not require
interpreting religious doctrine or tenets, or even ascertaining the school‘s
real motives. Instead, the Court must decide whether a neutral law of
general applicability (retaliation is illegal) supersedes a religious obligation
(retaliation is religiously required). Under Employment Division v. Smith,
as long as the law is neutral and generally applicable, it does not matter if it
substantially burdens a religious practice.59
57

When Perich went on leave, the school hired a replacement for the rest of the year instead of
hiring someone for a more limited time frame. As a result, the school could not lay off the replacement
if Perich were to return. Thus, it was in its financial interest to terminate Perich.
58
This is a big assumption, and a court might well decide that the claim is merely pretext for
discrimination rather than sincere. This is the same determination courts regularly make in
discrimination claims. See Corbin, supra note 20, at 2016–22 (explaining why pretext analysis does not
require courts to become entangled in theological or doctrinal issues). For example, Perich might offer
evidence that another teacher threatened to sue for breach of contract yet did not lose his job.
Indeed, in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., a case that parallels this
one, the Supreme Court gave its blessing to a pretext analysis. 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (link). In that case,
a born-again Christian school told a pregnant teacher she could not return to school the following year
because of its belief that mothers should stay home with their preschool children. Id. at 623. When she
threatened litigation, the school fired her for violating the mandatory internal dispute resolution
provision in her contract, arguing that Christians should not sue other Christians. Id. While the ultimate
holding focused on abstention issues, the Supreme Court noted that ―the Commission violates no
constitutional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of [the schoolteacher‘s] discharge in this
case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the
discharge.‖ Id. at 628.
59
In effect, if it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause for the state to ban a sacrament, as it did
in Smith, then it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause for the state to regulate those who might
administer a sacrament. Although here, of course, Perich is not administering any sacraments, and the
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Of course, even before Employment Division v. Smith, the fact that a
law burdened a religious tenet did not guarantee an exemption from that
law. Even if a church‘s religious tenets required that insubordinate
ministers be flogged, courts are not likely to exempt it from criminal assault
law.60 If the Court accepted the school‘s all-litigious-ministers-arespiritually-deficient argument, the church could dismiss as insubordinate
and spiritually unfit a minister who was raped by a coworker and brings a
sexual assault charge. A church could also terminate without interference a
minister who threatens to sue after the church breached its contract and
failed to pay the agreed-upon salary. Likewise, a church, religious school,
or religious hospital could fire as insubordinate and spiritually unfit a
minister who reports any wrongdoing, whether it be discrimination,
embezzlement, or the sexual abuse of children. In short, letting a religious
organization claim that a minister who insists on compliance with the law is
spiritually unfit creates a potentially limitless loophole and allows it to be a
―law unto itself.‖61
2. Reinstatement Issue
Does this mean that a church or religious school must keep a minister it
views as unqualified? Not necessarily. If a case presents a free exercise
question and there is no doubt that reinstatement would violate a religious
tenet, a compromise position might be to limit the remedy to damages.62
However, this alternative remedy should be used sparingly. After all, if a
minister was fired because of her disability (or age or race or sex) and the
church employer has no religious tenets requiring dismissal of people due to
disability (or age or race or sex), then there should be no problem with
letting her resume her post. Indeed, if discrimination distorted the decisionmaking process, then reinstatement would merely correct a church

issue before the Court is whether she should even be considered a minister.
60
Indeed, courts have held that anti-discrimination laws trump religious views. For example, courts
have held that religious schools must comply with Title VII and the Equal Pay Act even though their
religious tenets regard married men as heads of households and require providing them with better
health insurance or salaries than married women. See, e.g., EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d
1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the state could require a school to violate its religious tenets and
provide health insurance to married women as well as to singles and married men) (link); EEOC v. Tree
of Life Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 700, 716–17 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that the state could require
a school to violate its religious tenet and pay married women the same compensation as married men)
(link); see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec‘y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–06 (1985) (holding
that the state could force a religious organization to violate its religious beliefs and pay minimum wage
as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act) (link).
61
Cf. Emp‘t Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (arguing that the effect of granting
exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability ―would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land‖ and would allow the religious observer ―to become a law
unto himself‖).
62
This is in contrast to cases where there is reason to believe that the religious justification is a
pretext for discrimination.
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mistake.63
In addition to damages as an alternate remedy to reinstatement, there
may be constitutional protection for the church-clergy relationship, often
described as the ―lifeblood‖ of the church. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
which allowed the Boy Scouts to violate anti-discrimination laws on the
grounds that the presence of a gay scoutmaster would undermine the Boy
Scouts‘ anti-homosexual message,64 strengthened the First Amendment
freedom of association guaranteed by the Free Speech Clause. Like other
associations, churches have a free speech interest in selecting those who
represent and speak for them and, arguably, an associational right not to be
forced to hire or rehire a minister whose presence would undermine their
religious messages.65 However, for Hosanna-Tabor‘s decision to fire Perich
to be protected to the same degree as the Boy Scouts‘ decision in Dale,
Hosanna-Tabor would have to establish that keeping Perich as a third and
fourth grade teacher would distort a religious message.66 Even then, the
decision may still be illegal if the Court deems the anti-retaliation law to be
sufficiently tailored to advance a sufficiently important government
interest.67
B. Church Deference Approach: Deciding Whether Perich Is a Minister
The irony of this case is that while resolving this retaliation suit will
not embroil the Court in theological or doctrinal disputes, applying the
ministerial exception will. Thus, this case presents an example of how a
church autonomy or deference approach presents more Establishment
Clause problems than a neutral principles of law approach.
To trigger the ministerial exception, the plaintiff in a discrimination
suit must be a ―ministerial‖ employee. In determining who counts as a
ministerial employee, courts do not simply accept a religious employer‘s
characterization of a position, as it could insist that all of its employees
63
In other words, then, reinstatement might actually benefit the church by restoring to it someone it
would have employed but for unsanctioned discrimination. See Corbin, supra note 20, at 2023.
64
530 U.S. 640, 653–56 (2000) (link).
65
Religions that limit their clergy positions to men may continue the practice on the grounds that
admitting women would undermine their religious messages about the nature of ministry or the proper
roles of men and women.
66
To the extent that establishment issues may come up, they differ from those that arise in applying
the ministerial exception. To start, it is much more problematic to encounter an Establishment Clause
issue in applying in the ministerial exception when the very reason for its existence is to avoid
Establishment Clause issues. In addition, the question asked in applying the ministerial exception—
does this person perform religiously important duties—necessarily involves delving into religious
doctrine and beliefs. The questions asked in resolving a freedom of association claim—does the
religious employer have a religious message and does the presence of a particular employee distort that
message—do not involve delving into religious doctrine and beliefs, especially if the court is deferential
with regard to the first question.
67
Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 657–58 (balancing expressive associational interests against antidiscrimination goals of public accommodation law).
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were ministers.68 Instead, courts take a functional approach.69 In the Sixth
Circuit, Perich is a minister if her ―primary duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.‖70
This query ―necessarily requires a court to determine whether a
position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.‖ 71
But in order to decide whether Perich‘s primary teaching duties are
important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church, the Court
might have to delve into the religious beliefs of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church.
Teaching religion classes and leading prayers are clearly religious
activities and would readily qualify as religious duties. Yet these tasks only
account for approximately forty-five minutes out of Perich‘s seven-hour
work day, which is roughly eleven percent of her time.72 If those activities
were her only religious duties, then she would not count as a minister under
the primary duties test. However, what about the fact that she also serves as
a Christian role model for her students? That is an activity she performs all
day, every day. If that were a religiously important function, then she may
well qualify as a minister under the primary duties test. ―According to
Perich, using secular textbooks to teach secular subjects is a secular
activity; but according to the Church, the same activity is religious because
all teachers are required to serve as fine Christian role models.‖73 But
whether serving as a role model is religiously important—not whether it is
important in general, but whether it is important to the Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church‘s spiritual and pastoral mission—is not a
question the Court should answer.74 Courts should not mediate a dispute
about what is or is not important to a church‘s pastoral mission or resolve a
theological dispute about the religious role of schoolteachers.
Hosanna-Tabor concedes that the primary duties test invites

68

See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (a school
claimed that all its teachers ―consider teaching to be their personal ministry‖) (link); EEOC v. Sw.
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (a seminary claimed that all its
employees, including support staff, served a ministerial function) (link).
69
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (―[I]f to avoid having
to pay the minimum wage to its janitor a church designated all its employees ‗ministers,‘ the court
would treat the designation as a subterfuge.‖) (link).
70
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 369 F.3d 797, 803 (4th Cir. 2004)).
71
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)
(link).
72
Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 772.
73
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 52, at 16.
74
Cf. Corbin, supra note 20, at 2028 (discussing the distinction between deciding whether
something is religiously true and evaluating the credibility of religious reasons).
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Establishment Clause problems.75 To mitigate these problems, it suggests
that the Court should replace the primary duties test with a religious duties
test, where the question is whether the employee had performed any
important religious duties.76 Although this solution expands the ministerial
exception, it does not solve the underlying Establishment Clause issues.
To start, unless courts are willing to categorize anyone who performs
even one religious task as a minister, courts still have to draw the
quantitative line somewhere. Otherwise a school can make everyone a
minister by ensuring that each and every school employee, from the janitor
to the bookkeeper to the P.E. teacher, leads a prayer at least once or twice
during the school year. As a result, no one who works for a religious
school, hospital, nursing home, social service organization, or church would
have any employment protections.
In any event, even if the Court alters the threshold amount of religious
duties that the ministerial exception requires, courts may still have to
determine whether a particular duty was religiously ―important.‖ What if
Perich only taught secular subjects? Or what if, instead of a schoolteacher
for the Evangelical Lutheran Church, she served as its music director? In
order to decide whether a music director is a minister, the Court would have
to rule on the religious significance of music in the Evangelical Lutheran
Church.77 Again, this test wrongly places courts in the position of deciding
whether music is integral to a denomination‘s worship services or important
enough that teaching it makes someone a minister. Resolving theological
disputes about the significance of music to worship is exactly the kind of
doctrinal issue the courts are incompetent to make, yet it is exactly the kind
of decision that application of the ministerial exception may require.78
CONCLUSION
People who wish to serve their God should not have to choose between
their calling and their civil rights. Yet, the ministerial exception essentially
strips ministers of protection against discrimination based on race,79 sex,80
75
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 51, at 12–14 (agreeing that forcing courts to decide
which duties are secular and which are religious leads to religious entanglement).
76
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 45, at 22. Hosanna-Tabor also suggests that the Court should
defer and let the religious institution decide if a duty is religiously important. Id. at 48–49. But without
some kind of functional analysis, a religious organization can essentially claim that every employee does
some duty that is religiously important. See supra notes 68–69.
77
See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir. 2000) (link).
78
One appeals court noted that ―[t]he very invocation of the ministerial exception requires us to
engage in entanglement with a vengeance.‖ Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797
(9th Cir. 2005) (link).
79
See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a Hispanic communications manager could not bring a Title VII national origin claim)
(link); Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308–12 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that a
Director of Worship Arts (a music director) is barred from bringing a § 1981 claim) (link).
80
See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a college

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/22/

108

106: 96 (2011)

The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor

age,81 and, as here, disability, and leaves them outside the shelter of the
Family Medical Leave Act,82 the Fair Labor Standards Act,83 the Equal Pay
Act,84 and a host of other protective employment laws.85
This absolute immunity from lawsuits cannot be justified by either the
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. The ADA is a neutral
law of general applicability and therefore does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause, regardless of any religious burden it may impose on the HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School—though it is not at all
certain that compliance with the ADA burdens the school. In addition, to
the extent that Perich‘s case raises Establishment Clause problems, it is the
Court deciding whether she is a minister that raises such problems, not
deciding whether the school retaliated against her.
Jones v. Wolf approves a better approach: Apply employment
discrimination law to a religious employer in the same way it would be
applied to a secular employer. If a theological or doctrinal question comes
up, defer to the religious institution on that issue. Notably, accepting the
employer‘s answer to a theological question does not guarantee that the
religious employer will prevail. Even if it violates religious tenets to pay
ministers the minimum wage, a religious school might still be required to
obey the law.86 Likewise, it may violate religious tenets for ministers to
assert their legal rights, but religious employers might not be able to fire
someone for doing so. That is the holding of Employment Division v.
Smith: Religion is no longer grounds for exemptions from neutral laws of
general applicability. Only if compliance with anti-discrimination law
chaplain could not bring a Title VII sex discrimination claim).
81
See, e.g., Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding
that a music director could not bring an ADEA claim).
82
Fassl v. Our Lady of Perpetual Help Roman Catholic Church, No. Civ.A. 05-CV-0404, 2005 WL
2455253, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2005) (holding that a director of music is precluded from bringing an
FMLA suit).
83
See, e.g., Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 598 F.3d 668, 676–77 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that a seminarian who performed maintenance work and assisted with mass could not
bring a Washington Minimum Wage Act claim) (link); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472,
477–78 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that Salvation Army ministers who ran a rehabilitation center could not
bring an FLSA claim for violating minimum wage and overtime requirements) (link); Shaliehsabou v.
Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., 363 F.3d 299, 307 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a kosher supervisor of
a Jewish nursing home was barred from bringing an FLSA claim) (link).
84
See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the director of the Department of Religious Formation could not bring an Equal Pay Act
claim) (link).
85
See, e.g., id. (holding that a director of the Department of Religious Formation could not bring a
Title VII hostile work environment claim); Klouda v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 543 F. Supp.
2d 594, 612 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that a professor was barred from bringing breach of contract,
fraud, and promissory estoppel claims) (link).
86
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec‘y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–06 (1985) (holding that the
state could force a religious organization to violate its religious beliefs and pay the minimum wage, as
required by the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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undermines a religious message might one‘s right to freedom of association
trump anti-discrimination law.
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